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ABSTRACT
Recently, autonomous driving development ignited competi-
tion among car makers and technical corporations. Low-level
automation cars are already commercially available. But high
automated vehicles where the vehicle drives by itself with-
out human monitoring is still at infancy. Such autonomous
vehicles (AVs) rely on the computing system in the car to to
interpret the environment and make driving decisions. There-
fore, computing system design is essential particularly in
enhancing the attainment of driving safety. However, to our
knowledge, no clear guideline exists so far regarding safety-
aware AV computing system and architecture design. To
understand the safety requirement of AV computing system,
we performed a field study by running industrial Level-4 au-
tonomous driving fleets in various locations, road conditions,
and traffic patterns. The field study indicates that traditional
computing system performance metrics, such as tail latency,
average latency, maximum latency, and timeout, cannot fully
satisfy the safety requirement for AV computing system de-
sign. To address this issue, we propose a “safety score” as
a primary metric for measuring the level of safety in AV
computing system design. Furthermore, we propose a per-
ception latency model, which helps architects estimate the
safety score of given architecture and system design without
physically testing them in an AV. We demonstrate the use
of our safety score and latency model, by developing and
evaluating a safety-aware AV computing system computation
hardware resource management scheme.
1. INTRODUCTION
We are on the cusp of a transportation revolution where the
autonomous vehicle (also called self-driving cars, uncrewed
cars, or driverless cars) are likely to become an essential mo-
bility option [42]. The time when people can sit back and tell
their cars where to drive themselves is getting closer every
day. Today, autonomous vehicles (AVs) incorporate sophisti-
cated suites of sensors, such as cameras, light detecting and
ranging (LiDAR), and radar (Figure 1); These sensors are
backed by advanced computing system software and hard-
ware that interpret massive streams of data in real-time. As
such, autonomous driving promises new levels of efficiency
and takes driver fatigue and human errors out of the safety
equation.
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Figure 1: Top view of a typical autonomous vehicle with
various sensors.
However, the perceived technology will shift the burden
of safety guarantee towards the vehicle system, and there-
fore, we need to ensure the safe operation of autonomous
driving systems before releasing them to the public. As a
consequence, the U.S. Department of Transportation recently
released “A Vision for Safety” [7] to offer a path forward for
the safe deployment of AVs and encourage ideas that deliver
safer autonomous driving. Safety remains one of the most
critical requirements for autonomous driving system design.
This paper focuses on nominal safety (discussed in § 2.2)
of high automation vehicles, i.e., Level-4 autonomous vehi-
cles. While traditional cars rely on human drivers to make
driving decisions, future high automation vehicles will de-
pend on the computing system for driving decision making
(§ 2). Therefore, the computing system is one of the most
critical components to ensure safety.
To investigate safety implications on the AV computing
system design, we performed a field study (§ 3) by running
Pony.ai’s industrial Level-4 autonomous driving fleets un-
der testing in various locations, road conditions, and traffic
patterns. Based on the knowledge learned from extensive
data collected during our field study, we identify that tradi-
tional computing system metrics, such as tail latency, average
latency, maximum latency, and timeout, do not accurately
reflect the safety requirement of AV computing system de-
sign (§ 3.2). Instead, the level of AV safety is a non-linear
function of accumulative instantaneous computing system
response time and various external factors – including the
AV’s acceleration, velocity, physical properties (e.g., braking
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distance), traffic, and road condition.
To guide safety-aware AV computing system design, we
propose “safety score”, a safety metric that measures the
level of AV safety based on computing system response time
and the aforementioned external factors in a non-linear for-
mat (§ 4). Our safety score is rigorously derived from the
published industrial formal AV safety model, Responsibility-
Sensitive Safety (RSS) safety model [52]. RSS focuses on
general rules for an AV to keep a safe distance with surround-
ing vehicles. Our safety score bridges such a conceptual
model to AV computing system design with a quantitative
approach. We hope the proposed safety score will be an es-
sential contribution to the existing computer system metric
portfolio. To facilitate the computation of safety scores, we
also propose a latency model for offline computing system de-
sign evaluation. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• We provide a tutorial of state-of-the-art AV systems based
on our survey and the practical experience on our AV sys-
tems. We offer a detailed discussion of automation levels,
classification of safety requirements and standards, and
computing system software and hardware organizations.
• We perform a field study with our AV fleets. We present
observations and safety-aware computing system design
challenges based on the extensive data collected from our
field study.
• We propose a safety score, a metric that evaluates the level
of safety in AV computing system design. By analyzing
the safety score, we present a set of implications on safety-
aware AV system design.
• We propose a perception latency model, which allows AV
computing system architects to estimate the safety score
of a given computing system and architecture design in
various driving conditions, without physically testing them
in a car.
• We demonstrate an example of utilizing our safety score
and latency model to guide AV system computation re-
source management with a hardware and software co-
design.
2. STATE-OF-THE-ART AV SYSTEM
High automation cars are under development and testing
in both industry [1, 3, 5, 13] and academia [8, 11, 12]. To un-
derstand the current status of AV development, we examined
the state-of-the-art AV design, AV safety, and hardware and
software organizations.
2.1 Levels of Automation
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) categorizes
autonomous driving systems into six automation levels, which
range from no automation (Level-0) to full automation (Level-
5) [27]. Most commercialized autonomous driving systems
are on partial automation (Level-2) and conditional automa-
tion (Level-3). At Level-2, the vehicle can steer, accelerate,
and brake in certain circumstances; however, the driver needs
to respond to traffic signals, lane changes, and scan for haz-
ards. For example, Tesla’s latest Model S [3] is a Level-2
commercialized car. At Level-3, the car can manage most
aspects of driving, including monitoring the environment; but
the driver needs to be available to take over at any time when
the vehicle encounters a scenario it cannot handle [4]. For ex-
ample, NVIDIA recently announced a partnership with Audi
to build Level-3 autonomous driving cars [1]. High automa-
tion (Level-4) AVs are under development. A Level-4, AV
drives itself almost all the time without any human input, but
might be programmed not to operate in unmapped areas or
during severe weather. For instance, Waymo [5], originated as
a project of Google, is developing a Level-4 autonomous driv-
ing system [45]. Full automation vehicles (Level-5), which
can operate on any road and in any conditions that a human
driver could manage, is not yet demonstrated. But this is a
long-term goal of autonomous driving development.
This paper focuses on Level-4 AVs, which introduce much
more critical safety requirements on the computing system
than lower-level AVs. For example, Level-3 AVs treat human
drivers as a backup of the AV computing system; but Level-4
AVs entirely rely on the computing system to make driving
decisions in almost all scenarios.
2.2 AV Safety
In automotive industry, safety requirements are classified
into functional safety and nominal safety [52]. Functional
safety refers to the integrity of operation of vehicle’s electri-
cal system, including hardware and software. For example,
a hardware failure or a bug in software will both lead to a
functional safety hazard. Functional safety of vehicles is stan-
dardized by ISO 26262 [6], which defines various automotive
safety integrity levels that offer (a) failure-in-time targets for
hardware and (b) systematic processes for software devel-
opment and testing that conform with appropriate systems
engineering practices.
However, unlike in a conventional vehicle, computing sys-
tem plays an integral role in an AV. Even functionally safe,
AV can still crash due to untimely or unsafe driving decision.
As Riccardo Mariani, Intel Fellow and chief functional safety
technologist in the internet of things group, pointed out, cur-
rent ISO standard of functional safety is inadequate to ensure
the safety of AV [2]. This falls in the domain of nominal
safety. Nominal safety refers to whether the AV makes timely
and safe driving decisions, assuming that the hardware and
software are operating error free (i.e., functionally safe).
This paper focuses on nominal safety of AV. While soft-
ware module algorithm design determines whether a driv-
ing decision (e.g., braking, acceleration, or steering) is safe,
timely driving decision making heavily relies on the perfor-
mance of computing system and architecture design. Two
recent studies by Mobileye [52] and NVIDIA [47] defined
formal nominal safety rules for AV. However, these studies
focus on how to make planning and control decisions to keep
a safe distance with surrounding vehicles. To our knowledge,
no previous research investigates how to ensure timely driv-
ing decision making with safety-aware computing systems
design. As such, this paper focuses on exploring safety-aware
computing system design methodology that achieves timely
driving decision making, by mapping formal safety require-
ments onto AV computing system design.
Note that it is impossible to guarantee that an AV will never
be involved in an accident [52]. It is also difficult to predict
or control the activity of other vehicles [47]. Therefore, we
intend to guarantee that the AV will be sufficiently careful to
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Table 1: Computing system and architecture configura-
tions.
CPU Intel Xeon processor
Main memory 16GB DDR4
Operating system Ubuntu
GPU NVIDIA Volta architecture
Device memory 12GB HBM2
avoid becoming a cause of an accident, the same as recent
AV safety studies [52].
2.3 AV Computing System Architecture
The AV computing system performs similar tasks as a
driver of a conventional car, including localization, percep-
tion, and planning and control tasks (described in § 2.4). In
the rest of this paper, we call AV computing system as “AV
system” for short.
While embedded or low-end processors may be sufficient
to meet the computation requirement of Level-2 and Level-
3 AVs, current Level-4 AV system designs typically adopt
high-end heterogeneous architectures, which comprise so-
phisticated CPUs, GPUs, storage devices (e.g., terabytes of
SSDs), FPGAs [9] and other accelerators, to accommodate
the intensive computation demand. As such, high automation
AV systems are fundamentally different from conventional
real-time embedded systems [55]. Table 1 lists the heteroge-
neous architecture employed by our prototypes.
Implication: Although the computing system adopts server-
grade processors, it is impossible to minimize the latency of
all computation tasks due to the vast amount of interdepen-
dently executing software modules (discussed in § 2.5) and
the finite hardware resources in the system. As such, it is
critical to effectively utilize the limited hardware resources,
while meeting given safety requirement.
2.4 Tasks of AV Computing System
The computing system interacts with various sensors and
the car control system to perform three primary functions:
localization, perception, and planning and control. Figure 2
illustrates the general working flow of the state-of-the-art
Level-4 AV computing system.
Localization. Localization identifies the location of the ve-
hicle on a high definition map, based on the information
obtained from LiDAR, camera, and GPS. The high definition
map stores static information on the way, such as lane lines,
trees, guardrails, and the location of traffic lights and stop
signs [20]. GPS offers a prediction of the current location
of the vehicle on a global scale; but such prediction is not
sufficiently accurate to allow the computing system to per-
form driving tasks, e.g., staying within a lane on the road [21].
Therefore, GPS information needs to be accompanied with
LiDAR and camera “perception” (described below) of sur-
rounding static objects, to interpret the local environment
accurately.
Perception. Perception detects and interprets surrounding
static (e.g., lane lines, trees, and traffic lights) and moving
(e.g. other vehicles and pedestrians) objects with three types
of sensors, LiDAR, cameras, and millimeter-wave radar, as
shown in Figure 1. In the rest of the paper, we refer all the
objects, which can be detected by perception, i.e., in the
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Figure 2: AV computing system tasks.
detection range, as “obstacles”. Localization typically only
requires infrequent perception of static objects, while traffic
interpretation requires frequent (e.g., per-frame – each frame
of data collected by the sensors) perception of both static and
moving objects.
Compared to camera and radar, LiDAR offers much higher
accuracy on detecting the position, 3D geometry, speed, and
moving direction of obstacles [33, 50]. Therefore, most of
current Level-4 AVs highly rely on LiDAR to perform the
perception task [26, 31, 35]. LiDAR continues to emit lasers
across a 360 degree view. It receives reflected signals, when-
ever an obstacle blocks the laser. Based on the received
signals, we can build a “point cloud” to represent the location
and 3D geometry of the obstacle [49]; each point in the graph
represents a received signal.
In most cases, the computing systems can identify obstacle
properties based on the point clouds generated from LiDAR
data, as shown in the left part of Figure 5. Cameras facilitate
the obstacle interpretation by capturing color information
(the right part of Figure 5). Radar is used to detect the radial
speeds of moving obstacles [41]. After sensor data collec-
tion, the computing system performs a “perception fusion” to
integrate the data from the three types of sensors.
Overall, perception obtains accurate information of loca-
tion, geometry, speed, and moving direction of obstacles.
Such information is essential for localization and making
appropriate driving decisions to avoid collisions in plan-
ning/control.
Planning and control. The essential functions of planning
and control include prediction, trajectory planning, and vehi-
cle control. Their dependency relationship is shown in Fig-
ure 2. A motion planner employs localization and perception
information to make driving control decisions, such as steer-
ing angle, acceleration, and braking of the vehicle. Functional
safety is of critical importance to the motion planner. As such,
a backup mechanism, commonly radar or sonar [43], is used
to verify the conclusion informed by other components of
the system. With the perception results, the prediction func-
tion tracks the behavior of obstacles at real-time and predicts
their next movements. The computing system generates an
optimal trajectory for the vehicle, based on the prediction
and perception results. The control function will control the
steering, acceleration, and deceleration of the vehicle based
on the driving decision made by the planning function.
2.5 LiDAR Perception
As perception in most of the current Level-4 AV designs
heavily relies on LiDAR, we present more details of LiDAR
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perception.
Dependency graph. To process LiDAR data, the computing
system executes a considerable number of inter-dependent
software modules (i.e., software programs) at real-time. To
understand the dependency relationship among these soft-
ware modules, we build a dependency graph based on our
AV system. Figure 3 shows an example1. LiDAR percep-
tion consists of a set of main modules (shown in blue) and
sub-modules (shown in orange). For example, the Labeling
module first sorts out a rectangular region-of-interest (ROI),
which restricts the range of LiDAR detection; then, it calls
its four sub-modules to perform finer-grained labeling within
the ROI. As another example, Segmentation extracts useful
semantic and instance information (e.g., surrounding vehicles
and pedestrians) from the background. The Merge module
clusters the points, which are likely to belong to the same
object, in a point cloud; the Filter modules process the point
clouds. Some software modules, e.g., Segmentation, do not
only impose long latency, but also have a strong dependency
with other software modules.
Implication: Due to their long latency and high depen-
dency, certain software modules contribute more to the over-
all perception latency and computing system response time
than other modules. Therefore, these modules are typically
more safety critical.
2.6 Types of Computing System Workloads
AV system workloads consist of both machine learning
and non-machine-learning (non-ML) software modules. In
our AVs, camera perception software modules are commonly
deep-learning-based computer vision workloads; but most of
the software programs in our AV system are non-ML. For ex-
ample, some classification and segmentation modules can em-
ploy Support Vector Machine (SVM) [51] and fully connected
1We only show renamed high-level modules due to confidential
reasons.
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networks; camera data perception may adopt ResNet [30].
Currently, lots of the software programs running in our AV
system, even for the perception task, are non-ML workloads;
many of these non-ML workloads are as time-consuming and
compute-intensive as deep learning workloads. One such
example is the Segmentation module shown in Figure 3.
Furthermore, many software modules can execute on both
CPU and GPU with the same algorithms but different imple-
mentations. This introduces substantial flexibility in manag-
ing and allocating the various hardware resources among the
software workloads.
3. FIELD STUDY AND OBSERVATIONS
To explore realistic AV safety requirement and computing
system hardware/software behaviors, we run a fleet of Level-4
AVs in various locations, road conditions, and traffic patterns
over three contiguous months. Our field study yields over
200 hours and 2000 miles of traces with a considerable size
of data. The data is collected at the granularity of one sensor
frame, which is the smallest granularity that the computing
system interprets and responses to obstacles. With each frame,
we collect (1) the execution latency of each software module,
(2) total computing system response time, (3) the utilization
of computing system hardware resources (CPU, GPU, and
memories), (4) the environment information obtained by the
sensors (e.g., the distribution of static and moving obstacles),
and (5) instantaneous velocity and acceleration of the AV.
Our field study is performed as part of the company’s
routine road tests. The data we collected incorporates a large
variety of scenarios, including near-accident scenes.
3.1 Observations
Breakdown of computing system response time and the
impact of architecture design. As shown in Figure 4(a),
the majority (74%) of computing system response time is
consumed by perception. LiDAR perception is the major
contributor to perception latency. As nominal safety requires
a timely response, it is critical to ensure timely LiDAR per-
ception. In addition, we observe that most of the workloads
running in our AV system are compute-intensive. Various
software modules have a large variety of computation re-
quirements and parallelism characteristics. As a result, native
heterogeneous system hardware resource management easily
results in unbalanced compute resource utilization, leading
to significant delays in software execution.
Safety-critical software module analysis. We further ana-
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Figure 5: An emergency hardbrake case that we encoun-
tered.
lyze the execution latency of the main modules. Figure 4(b)
shows an example with LiDAR perception modules by il-
lustrating average, maximum and minimum, and tail latency
of the ten main software modules across thousands of ex-
ecutions during our months of field study. We have two
critical observations. First, maximum, average, and tail la-
tency yields different criticality rankings on the modules.
For example, specific modules with high maximum latency
(e.g., Occupancy grid) have low average and tail latency. We
observe that maximum latency is typically achieved in safety-
challenging scenarios, such as heavy traffic and near-accident
situations, e.g., Figure 5 explained below. Therefore, maxi-
mum latency better indicates safety-criticality of a software
module than other formats of latency. Second, we observe
that safety-critical modules also typically have strict inter-
dependency with other modules in the dependency graph. Ex-
amples include Segmentation and Filter. Based on the two ob-
servations, safety-critical modules can be identified as those
having long maximum latency and strict inter-dependency
with other modules.
Timely traffic perception is the most critical to AV safety.
Due to the limited ranges of sensor detection, the comput-
ing system has limited time (typically within one or several
sensor sampling intervals) to interpret an obstacle in the traf-
fic after it enters the sensor-detectable region. Moreover, as
perception consumes the majority of computing system re-
sponse time, timely traffic perception is the most critical to
AV safety. Specifically, LiDAR perception is the most safety
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Figure 6: The relationship between LiDAR perception
latency and computing system response time.
critical in our AV system (and many other Level-4 AV im-
plementations), because most of the perception task relies on
LiDAR. In fact, we encountered several safety emergencies,
when the AV needed to perform a hardbrake due to the delay
of LiDAR perception. Figure 5 illustrates one of such safety
emergency incidents we encountered. As shown in the right
camera view, a white SUV is passing through an intersection,
when our AV intends to enter the same intersection2. Our
system recognized the traversing SUV within a LiDAR sam-
pling interval and ended up performing a hardbrake as shown
in Figure 5(d). But if the perception had taken slightly longer
time, a collision would have happened.
Correlation between perception latency and obstacle dis-
tribution. We observe that perception latency depends on
both computing system configuration and the distribution of
obstacles (especially in traffic). With a given computing sys-
tem hardware configuration, obstacles closer to the vehicle
have a higher impact on perception latency than distant ones.
Furthermore, obstacles that horizontally distribute in front of
the vehicle have a higher impact on perception latency than
those distributed in other directions. Finally, among the close
obstacles, the denser the obstacle distribution, the longer the
perception latency would be. The rationale underlying is that
close, horizontally-distributed, and dense obstacles reflect
more LiDAR signals than other obstacles, hence generate
more data for LiDAR perception.
Latency accumulation effect. We observe a latency accu-
mulation effect of certain software modules. Figure 6 il-
lustrates an example of LiDAR perception modules: once
LiDAR perception latency exceeds 100ms, the system re-
sponse time increases at a much higher rate (in the region
with a steeper slope in Figure 6) with the increase of LiDAR
perception latency. The reason is two-fold. First, because Li-
DAR has a fixed sampling rate (with a 100ms interval in our
AV), the perception, if not completed within the sampling in-
terval, will further delay the processing of subsequent frames.
Second, as software modules are inter-dependent, a delay of
one software module will further delay its dependent soft-
ware modules. The slopes and thresholds of the accumulation
effect vary across different software modules, depending on
individual characteristics and the inter-dependency relation-
ship with other modules.
Impact of other external factors. Besides traffic, several
other external factors also have a critical impact on the safety
requirement of AV system design. These factors include the
acceleration and velocity of the AV and vehicles around it,
AV’s physical properties (e.g., braking distance), and road
2The white SUV entered the intersection before the traffic light
turned red, passing through at a high speed.
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condition. Taking the scenario in Figure 5 as an example, if
our AV had a higher velocity or longer braking distance, the
collision would also have happened.
3.2 Safety-aware Design Challenges
As discussed in § 2.2, this paper focuses on nominal safety
that ensures timely driving decision making by the computing
system. It seems that timely driving decision making can be
achieved by minimizing the computing system response time.
However, this is challenging. To ensure achievable minimum
response time within finite computing system hardware re-
sources, performance optimization needs to be guided by
specific metrics. Based on our field study, traditional com-
puting system performance metrics, such as average latency,
maximum latency, tail latency, and timeouts, do not accu-
rately reflect the safety requirement of AV systems due to the
following reasons.
First, AV safety is determined by instantaneous response
time (Figure 5), instead of statistical patterns adopted in tra-
ditional performance metrics. Second, it is challenging to
predict the response times due to the complex inter-dependent
relationships between software modules and the latency ac-
cumulation effect. Third, AV safety is also determined by
various external factors as discussed in our field study obser-
vations. As a result, the level of AV safety is not a simple
weighted sum of the elements, but a non-linear function of
response time as we identified in our study (§ 4). Finally,
although timeout is widely used to measure real-time system
performance [55], it is impractical to simply use timeout to
evaluate the safety of AV system design: It is difficult to
determine the threshold required to calculate the timeout of
AV system response time, because each software module
has a different threshold (e.g., different sampling interval
with various sensors); External factors further lead to dynam-
ically changing thresholds. Therefore, we need to rethink the
fundamental metric used to guide safety-aware AV system
design.
4. SAFETY SCORE
In this section, we propose safety score, a metric that mea-
sures the level of AV safety based on computing system
response time and external factors to guide safety-aware AV
system design.
4.1 Safety Score Description
Our safety score is rigorously derived from the published
industrial formal AV safety model – Responsibility-Sensitive
Safety (RSS) [52]. RSS is developed by Mobileye, an Intel
subsidiary that develops advanced driver-assistance systems
(ADAS) to provide warnings for collision prevention and
mitigation. RSS defines safe distances around an AV, formal
mathematical models that identify the emergency moment,
when the safe distances are compromised, and proper plan-
ning and control decisions an AV needs to perform during an
emergency. RSS has been endorsed by various AV projects,
such as Valeo [14] and Baidu’s Apollo Program [10].
Unfortunately, RSS does not provide many insights on
safety-aware computing system design. To give a quantitative
guideline for safety-aware computing system design, we map
RSS to the safety score based on our field study observations.
Table 2: Variables in safety score.
Variable Description
t Instantaneous computing system response time,
defined by Equation 2.
θ Response time window.
α , β Indicating the velocity and acceleration of an AV
and surrounding vehicles, defined by Equation 8
in Appendix A.
σ , η Reward or penalty on the level of safety, when t
is lower or higher than θ , respectively.
The safety score is defined as the following equation (check
Appendix A for precise mathematical formulation of safety
score):
Safety Score =
{
σ [α(θ 2− t2)+β (θ − t)], i f t < θ
η [α(θ 2− t2)+β (θ − t)], elsewhere
(1)
The variables in the equation are described in Table 2.
Here, t is the “instantaneous” computing system response
time, which we define as the response time to one frame of
sensor data (or several frames depending on the perception
granularity of an AV implementation). We calculate t by the
following equation:
t =
N
∑
i=1
wi(ti) (2)
Here, ti is the instantaneous latency of a safety-critical
module on the critical path; N is the total number of such
modules. Safety critical modules are determined based on
the inter-dependency relationship in the dependency graph
and the maximum latency via the extensive pre-product road
tests (§ 3). wi() is an accumulation effect function, which
reflects the contribution of ti to system response time t. For
each safe-critical module, we obtain a latency accumulation
effect curve that can be described by a function wi(). Figure 6
shows an example of such curves, where the x-axis is ti and
y-axis is the value of wi(ti). But curve shapes vary across
different modules.
The rest variables in Equation 1 reflect the impact of ex-
ternal factors. The response time window θ is the minimum
time that the AV would take to avoid hitting another vehicle
that is certain distance d away, if both vehicles keep moving
at the same direction, velocity, and acceleration, i.e., neither
of vehicles perform any response to a reducing distance. We
allow AV developers to define the distance d in various man-
ners, e.g., as (1) a minimum safe distance allowed by traffic
rules, which is adopted by our experiments as an example
to make our evaluation more concrete or (2) a user-defined
confident safe distance. Figure 16 in Appendix A provides a
more detailed analysis of θ .
Variables α and β reflect the velocity and acceleration of
the AV and the surrounding vehicle, calculated by Equation 8
in Appendix A. Safety reward σ and penalty η are user-
defined coefficients, which indicate the user’s confidence of
safety. We allow users to adjust the reward and penalty based
on their own road test experiences, such as the velocity of the
vehicles in the traffic that the AV is likely to run into, road
condition, and AV braking distance. We discuss more detailed
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implications of the reward and penalty in § 4.2. Appendix A
provides more detailed discussion of these variables.
No clear boundary is defined between safe and unsafe in
various AV safety models [47, 52]. As such, the safety score
does not intend to give a threshold of safe versus unsafe
either. Instead, it implies the level of safety – higher safety
score (could be either positive or negative) indicates safer AV
system design.
4.2 Implications to Computing System Design
Based on our practical experience, safety score provides
the following key implications on the safety-aware AV system
design.
Nonlinearity. The safety score is a non-linear function of
instantaneous response time t. Safety-aware computing sys-
tem design approach highly relies on the shape of the curve.
Figure 7 lists a few examples of safety score curves as a func-
tion of t. With a given set of external factors, the shape of
the curve is determined by response time window θ , safety
reward σ , and safety penalty η . Based on our road tests, the
majority of safety emergency scenarios happen when t > θ .
When t < θ , further optimizing the instantaneous response
time does not significantly improve the level of safety. There-
fore, in practice the shape of the safety score curve appears
like the bold line (σ=0.05, η=0.1) shown in Figure 7, with a
lower reward than penalty. As such, computing system design
needs to prioritize reducing the instantaneous response time
t, when t > θ .
Instantaneous latency. As we discussed before, the safety
score is computed by instantaneous response time per sensor
frame. Therefore, it is infeasible to adopt traditional perfor-
mance metrics calculated based on statistical performance
behaviors, such as tail, average, and maximum and minimum
latency. § 7.1 quantitatively compares various metrics.
Safety impact across various software modules. Due to
the complex inter-dependency relationship and latency accu-
mulation effect of the software modules, the instantaneous
latency of different software module has different impact on
safety score. This is modeled by Equation 2, where each
software module has a disparate form of the contribution to
the instantaneous AV system response time.
5. LATENCY MODEL
The goal of our latency model is to estimate the instan-
taneous response time in safety score, given obstacle distri-
bution and computation resource allocation. Our field study
shows that perception latency is a significant contributor to
system response time (§ 3). Therefore, we focus on modeling
perception latency.
Our model is built based on two observations: first, closer
and denser obstacles lead to higher perception latency (§ 3);
second, latency also depends on computation resources allo-
cated to run a software module3. Figure 8 shows an overview
of our latency model. The model input includes (1) obstacle
density distribution and (2) computation resource allocation
of each software module. The output is the estimated latency
of each software module, i.e., ti in Equation 2. Our latency
model estimates ti in two steps:
• We first estimate a baseline latency (τi), which is the la-
tency of executing a software module on a baseline com-
putation resource (e.g., CPU in our AV system), using a
baseline latency model presented by Equation 3.
• Then, we calculate ti with latency conversion ratios based
on given resource allocation plan.
In the following, we use LiDAR perception as an example to
discuss our latency model in detail and can surely apply it to
other perception modules, such as camera, radar, etc. § 7.2
evaluates the accuracy of our latency model.
5.1 Model Input
Obstacle density distribution vector. We design an obsta-
cle count map to represent obstacle density distribution. The
map divides the sensor ROI into regular grids, with each grid
storing the number of obstacles in it. For example, our AV
has a 64m × 50m ROI with a 2m× 2m grid size. This grid
size captures most moving objects on the road, e.g., vehi-
cles and bicycles. But large obstacles, which spread across
multiple grids, are counted multiple times. To express more
accurate obstacle density, we adopt a hierarchy of three levels
of obstacle count maps with a grid size of 2m× 2m, 8m×10m,
and 64m × 50m (the whole ROI), respectively. With the map
hierarchy, we generate an obstacle density distribution vector
~x as illustrated in Figure 8(b).
Computation resource allocation vector. We represent com-
putation resource allocation by a resource index vector ~r,
where each element in the vector indicates the resource alloca-
tion of a software module. For example, our current AV imple-
mentation only has two resource allocation options, running
on CPU (index=0) or GPU (index=1). Then,~r= [0,0,1, ...,0]
indicates that software modules are executed on CPU, CPU,
GPU, ..., CPU.
5.2 Latency Model
Perception software modules vary in complexity. We take
into account the diversity in the algorithm complexity and
model the baseline latency of each software module (τi) by
the following equation,
τi =~a · (~x~x)+~b · (~x log(~x))+~c ·~x+ ~d · log(~x)+ e (3)
Here, x is a m+n+1 dimension obstacle density distribu-
tion vector, where m and n are the grid counts in the finest
3In our current AV system, such hardware resource allocation refers
to whether executing a software module on CPU or GPU. Although
our system does not adopt FPGA or other accelerators, our latency
model applies to general heterogeneous architecture design with a
variety of hardware resources
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Figure 8: Overview of the proposed perception latency model. (a) Sources of perception latency. (b) Latency model
working flow.
and second-level hierarchy, respectively. The operator 
is coefficient-wise vector product, and · is the inner vector
product.
This is a standard curve fitting problem. To solve for co-
efficients~a,~b,~c, ~d, and e in the equation, we perform linear
regression on massive road testing data, which is used to gen-
erate the model input data, i.e., obstacle density distribution
and corresponding baseline latency.
The final latency of each perception module then can be
estimated by
ti = τiν(ri) (4)
Here, ν(ri) is the ratio of executing the same module on a
different computation resource than the baseline. This ratio
is determined by exhaustive search of running a software
module with various computation resource allocation config-
urations.
6. AV SYSTEM RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
We demonstrate an example of utilizing our safety score
and latency model to guide the computing system design,
by designing a heterogeneous computation resource man-
agement scheme. The goal of resource management is to
determine the computation hardware resource allocation of
each software module and the priority of software module
execution to optimize safety score.
Overview. Our resource management has two phases,
resource planning and resource scheduling. During the plan-
ning phase, we perform an exhaustive search of computation
resource allocation and priority options of executing software
modules in various obstacle distributions, to determine the
options that maximize safety score given each obstacle dis-
tribution. This yields a resource management plan for each
obstacle distribution. During the scheduling phase, we match
the current obstacle distribution with resource management
plans and determine the plan to use. To ensure sufficient
resources to be scheduled for each software module, our AV
system maintains redundant computation resources. Due to
the large searching space, resource planning usually takes a
long time. Therefore, we perform the planning phase offline,
while the AV system only performs online scheduling. To fur-
ther accelerate the online scheduling, offline planning groups
obstacle distributions associated with the same resource man-
agement plan to clusters. As such, the scheduling phase only
needs to match clusters.
6.1 Offline Planning
The offline planning phase analyzes the massive data col-
lected by road tests to create a set of resource management
plans with various obstacle distributions. A resource manage-
ment plan includes (i) the computation resources allocated
for software module execution (CPU or GPU in our current
AV system design) and (ii) the priority of software modules,
which is used to determine which module gets executed first,
when multiple choices exist.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the offline planning procedure. For
each field study sample, which comprises instantaneous com-
puting system response time and the latency of each software
module for an obstacle distribution, we perform an exhaustive
search in the space of resource management plans. We cat-
egorize the samples, which achieve the highest safety score
for the same resource management plan, in the same cluster.
Based on our field study, samples in the same cluster have
similar (1) obstacle density distribution and (2) perception
timeout pattern, which is the number of continuous incidents
where the perception latency exceeds the sensor sampling
interval (e.g., a LiDAR sampling interval is 100ms). There-
fore, we concatenate these two as the feature, and compute
the feature vector of each cluster by averaging the feature of
each sample in the cluster.
This phase only need to be done once, whenever the AV
adapts to a new location or physical system. In practice, we
found that the clustering and the associated resource manage-
ment plans are stable over time, even though users can also
periodically run the offline phase to re-calibrate.
Algorithm 1 Offline planning.
1: Input : Obstacle density distribution vector S ∈ RN×m
2: Input : Timeout pattern K ∈ RN×m
3: Input : Dependency graph G
4: Input : Computation resource management plans P
5: Input : Sa f ety score f unction L
6: Out put : Category f eatures F ∈ Rk×2m
7: Init : Category Dictionary D
8: for i= 1→ N do
9: P∗i = argmaxPj L(G,Pj,Si)
10: append Si ⊕ Ki to D[P∗i ]
11: for j = 1→ k do
12: for q= 1→ m do
13: Fj,q← mean(D[Pj]q)
8
Counter
Main memory
G
P
U
CPU
Comparator
…                                          …
Features (Fi)                   RM plans
Index
Hardware Software
Start
Timeout?
Step 1: Timeout pattern monitoring
Y
Continuous timeout?
N
Y
Step 2: Cluster matching
N
Step 3: Resource management plan switching
=
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
safety score 1/tail latency 1/average latency 1/maximum
latency
N
o
rm
al
iz
ed
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
ea
ch
  
m
et
ri
c
RM 1 RM 2 RM 3 RM 4 RM 5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CPU CPU+GPU Proposed
framework
N
o
rm
al
iz
ed
 s
af
et
y 
sc
o
re
Figure A-1: Computing system and architecture design that performs safety aware 
online resource management.
Figure A-2: Comparison resource management 
(RM) results guided by various metrics.
Figure A-3: Safety score with 
various system configurations.
Fe
tc
h
 f
ea
tu
re
s
Fetch RM plans
Reset
Figure 9: AV computing system design that performs
safety-aware online monitoring and scheduling.
6.2 Online Monitoring and Scheduling
The online phas adopts a software/hardware co-design
approach to (1) monitor the computing system execution
and (2) match the resource management plans. Figure 9
shows a system design overview. When the AV is driving, the
computing system continuously (1) monitors instantaneous
system response time and the pattern of perception timeout
and (ii) determines when and which resource management
plan to adopt.
A loop of three steps implements this: (Step-1) percep-
tion timeout pattern monitoring, (Step-2) cooperative cluster
matching, and (Step-3) plan switching. The online phase
triggers a hardware-based perception timeout pattern moni-
toring, whenever one of the safety critical perception software
modules has a timeout (e.g. LiDAR); the monitoring hard-
ware counts the number of continuous timeouts across the
subsequent LiDAR sampling intervals to identify whether
timeout happens accidentally or continuously, e.g., over a
user-defined h continuous timeouts. Based on our field study,
LiDAR perception timeout happens either accidentally for a
few times or continuously for more than 100 frames. There-
fore, we set h to be 100. If continuous timeout happens,
the online phase performs the next two steps based on the
following equations:
index= argmin
i
‖Fcurrent −Fi‖ (5)
pi = D[index] (6)
where Fcurrent = Scurrent ⊕Kcurrent . This is the current fea-
ture vector, which is the concatenation of current obstacle
density distribution vector Scurrent and current timeout pattern
Kcurrent ; ⊕ is the concatenation operator. Fi is the feature
vector of the ith cluster, which consists of the obstacle density
distribution vector and timeout pattern of the ith cluster. As-
suming road condition and traffic pattern do not dramatically
change within a certain amount of time, the online resource
management software will scan the features of all clusters
and identify a matching cluster, by finding the cluster with
the closest feature as the current one.
Hardware and software implementation. To meet the real-
time requirement of online resource management, we imple-
ment Step-1 in CPU hardware by adding a set of comparators
and counters as shown in Figure 9. The comparators track the
timeouts; the counters accumulate the number of continuous
timeouts. In our AV system, an 8-bit counter is sufficient to
capture the continuous timeout patterns. Step-2 and Step-3
are triggered once Step-1 detects continuous timeouts. As a
result, these Step-2 and Step-3 are performed infrequently.
As such, we implement the primary functionality of these
two steps by software as a load balancer [40, 46] in CPU; it
acts as a reverse proxy of software module scheduling across
CPU and GPU. The user-level implementation imposes negli-
gible performance overhead demonstrated by our experiment
results, due to the infrequent cluster matching and resource
management plan switching. In our AV system, the software
modules that can execute on both CPU and GPU are imple-
mented and compiled with both versions. We store the indices
generated during Step-2 in CPU main memory. Step-3 reads
the memory to identify the resource management plan with
the current feature.
7. EVALUATION
Our evaluation employs two simulators. First, to evaluate
safety score, we use an in-house AV simulator, which replays
and analyzes road testing data4. Second, we use an in-house
computer architecture simulator to evaluate the effectiveness
of the online resource monitoring and scheduling in our re-
source management scheme. We compare three computing
system architecture configurations and resource management
policies:
• CPU – Executing all software modules on CPU;
• CPU+GPU – The native heterogeneous AV system design.
It employs tail latency to determine the priority of software
module execution in resource management, with the GPU
to accelerate all deep learning software modules.
• Resource management – Heterogeneous AV computing
system design with our resource management scheme. The
results take into account the performance overhead of the
online monitoring and scheduling phase.
7.1 The Need for Safety Score
Our safety-score, which is rigorously derived from the
RSS model, measures the level of safety of AV system design.
Furthermore, our AV simulator results show that the level of
safety identified by our safety score is in line with the level
of safety based on the probability of collisions.
To demonstrate that other traditional latency metrics do not
accurately indicate the level of safety, we compare computing
system resource management results guided by safety score,
95th percentile tail latency (99th percentile tail latency yields
similar results), average latency, and maximum latency. We
perform an exhaustive search of resource management plans
for software modules. Due to space limitation, Figure 10
shows an example of five resource management plans. But
the following observations hold with our exhaustive search.
For fair comparison, we present the results obtained under
the same set of obstacle distributions.
The results (the higher the better) show that safety-score-
guided resource management leads to entirely different re-
4The simulator is also used by the company to analyze routine road
testing data.
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Figure 10: Resource management (RM) guided by vari-
ous metrics (y-axis is normalized to the maximum of each
metric).
sults than other metrics. For example, the safety score in-
dicates that we should choose RM-1, whereas RM-2, RM-3,
and RM-4 leads to the best tail latency, average latency, and
maximum latency, respectively. Therefore, guiding the com-
puting system design by these traditional latency metrics can
be misleading; it is critical to adopt safety score.
7.2 Latency Model Analysis
Pearson correlation coefficient. We adopt the Pearson cor-
relation coefficient [19] to evaluate the correlation between
LiDAR perception latency and obstacle density distribution.
Figure 11 depicts a heat map of Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients distributed in an obstacle count map hierarchy, based
on real driving scenarios during our field study. Instead of the
count of obstacles, each grid in Figure 11 stores a Pearson
correlation coefficient. The coefficient measures the correla-
tion between obstacle density and LiDAR perception latency:
the higher the coefficient, the larger the correlation between
the two. Figure 11 uses colors to express Pearson correlation
coefficient values: the darker the color, the larger the value.
As such, in the areas with darker colors, LiDAR perception
latency is more susceptible to obstacle density. We make
three observations from Figure 11. First, LiDAR perception
latency is more susceptible to nearby obstacles than those far
away. This is in line with our field study observation. Sec-
ond, both the top left and top right areas have high Pearson
coefficient. This may be caused by heavy horizontal traffic
through an intersection during rush hours. Finally, LiDAR
perception latency is more sensitive to the density than the
distribution of obstacles.
Model accuracy. We use mean squared error (MSE) [54]
(the lower the better) to evaluate the accuracy of our percep-
tion latency model quantitatively. We investigate our latency
model under a variety of driving scenarios, such as morn-
ing and afternoon, rush hours and non-rush hours, and local
roads and express ways. The proposed latency model consis-
tently provides high accuracy with an average MSE as low as
1.7×10−4.
Model coefficient. We borrow the above heat map method-
ology to analyze the coefficients in our perception latency
model. Figure 12 shows the coefficients obtained based on
our field study data. We make two observations. First, most
coefficients are non-zero. Second, coefficients of different
terms in Equation 3 have a significant variation on values.
The coefficients of lower-order terms have larger values than
those of higher-order terms. For instance, ~a (Figure 12(a)),
which are the coefficients of the highest order term x2 in
Equation 3, has the smallest values at a scale of 10−8.
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7.3 Resource Management Analysis
Figure 13 compares the safety score of three different AV
system architecture configurations and resource management
policies. Compared with CPU and CPU+GPU, Resource
Management achieves the highest safety score, which is 1.3×
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Figure 15: Average response time of various computing
system designs.
and 4.6× higher than CPU+GPU and CPU, respectively.
Beyond improving safety, Resource Management also im-
proves computing system performance and energy efficiency.
Figure 14 compares the energy-delay product (EDP) of vari-
ous configurations. Resource Management leads to the high-
est EDP in both LiDAR perception alone and the whole com-
puting system. Our hardware modifications to implement
online resource management only impose less than 1% of
total system energy consumption. Figure 15 compares the
average response time of various configurations. Compared
with CPU and GPU+CPU, Resource management reduces
the response time averaged throughout our field study data
by 2.4× and 35%, respectively; LiDAR perception latency is
reduced by 2.6× and 45% on average.
8. RELATED WORK
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to propose a safety
metric and latency model used for guiding AV computing
systems and architecture design, based on a large-scale field
study of real industry Level-4 AVs. In this section, we discuss
related works on AV nominal safety policies, safety-aware AV
system design, and heterogeneous computing system design.
AV nominal safety policies. Two recent studies, RSS [52]
and SFF [47], investigated AV nominal safety policies. Both
studies define the high-level concept of AV nominal safety.
Our paper is in line with this high-level safety concept. Unfor-
tunately, neither of the studies investigates safety requirement
on computing systems and architecture design. SFF [47]
focuses on policies that ensure safe driving decisions, e.g.,
braking, acceleration, and steering, under given limitations,
such as perception visibility and AV system response time.
SFF guides the computing system software algorithm design
to enforce safety policies. But the study does not provide poli-
cies on timely driving decision making, which is one of the
essential goals of computing systems and architecture design.
RSS [52] develops a set of general rules to ensure collision
avoidance, by enforcing that the AV keeps a safe distance
with surrounding vehicles. To this end, the safety rules treat
the AV and surrounding vehicles as objects with given veloc-
ity and acceleration, without implications on the requirement
of AV internal systems (including the computing system).
Our study focuses on the nominal safety requirements of AV
computing systems and architecture design.
Safety-aware AV system design. Most previous safety-
aware AV system designs focus on developing software mod-
ule algorithms [15, 23, 28, 29, 32, 38, 39, 48]. For instance,
recent works improve the latency and precision of LiDAR-
and camera-based perception, by leveraging video sensing,
laser rangefinders, light-stripe range-finder to monitor all
around the autonomous driving vehicle to improve safety
with a map-based fusion system [16, 38, 48]. Several studies
enhance the quality of driving decisions by optimizing per-
ception and planning software algorithms [28, 29]. Previous
works also investigate ways of effectively responding to un-
certainty at real-time [15, 32, 39] and path planning to avoid
static obstacles [23].
AV computing system design. Most previous studies on AV
systems and architecture design focus on accelerator design
and energy efficiency improvement of deep learning or com-
puter vision software execution [34, 42]. The performance
and energy optimizations are guided by standard performance
metrics. Safety requirement is not adequately considered in
most of these studies. As our evaluation demonstrates, safety-
aware computing system design leads to different architecture
and systems designs compared with guided by traditional de-
sign metrics. However, our metric and latency model can
also be used to guide deep learning and computer vision
accelerator design in AV systems.
Heterogeneous computing system design. AV computing
systems adopt sophisticated heterogeneous architectures used
in real-time scenarios. Prior works on real-time heteroge-
neous computing systems [22, 25, 53] focus on embedded
processors, rather than sophisticated architectures. Previous
studies that investigate server-grade CPU and GPU processor
based systems focus on distributed and data center applica-
tions [17, 18, 24, 36, 37, 44]; in such cases, scalability is a
more critical issue than single-system resource limitation.
Furthermore, neither type of heterogeneous system use cases
has the level of safety requirements as autonomous driving.
9. CONCLUSION
In summary, this paper proposes a safety score and per-
ception latency model to guide safety-aware AV computing
system design. Furthermore, we elaborated detailed AV com-
puting system architecture design and workloads, as well as
discussing a set of implications of safety-aware AV system
design based on a field study with industrial AVs, and demon-
strate the use of our safety score and latency model with
a safety-aware heterogeneous computation resource man-
agement scheme. As high automation vehicles are still at
the early stages of development, we believe our work only
scratched the surface of safety-aware AV system design. Sub-
stantial follow-up work is required to enhance the computing
system design towards safe autonomous driving.
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APPENDIX
A. SAFETY SCORE FORMULATION
Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) [52] formalizes safety
as assuring five common-sense rules, which AV driving pol-
icy should obey. Specifically, the policy will choose safe
actions under various circumstances. The action is safe, if (1)
given the current driving state and the actions and (2) when
the surrounding vehicles are acting adversely but reasonably,
a collision can be avoided.
More formally, a given driving state {v,amax,+,amin,−} of
the AV and the driving state {v′,a′max,+,a′min,−,a′max,−} of the
vehicle that might have collision with the AV (referred to
as “obstacle-of-attention”), together determine the minimum
distance dmin to avoid collision by Equation 7:
dmin = vt+
1
2
amax,+t2+
(v+ tamax,+)2
2amin,−
+m(v′t ′+
1
2
a′max,+t
′2)
+n
(v′+ t ′a′max,+)2
2a′∗,−
+dµ (7)
Here, v and v′ are velocities of the AV and the obstacle-of-
attention, respectively; amin/max,+/− is the minimum/maximum
acceleration of speeding up(+) or slowing down(−). Let t
and t ′ be the response times of the AV and the obstacle-
of-attention. All variables are non-negative: velocities and
accelerations only represent the absolute value.
Parameters m and n are used to represent whether the two
vehicles are driving in the opposite or the same directions.
The values are scenario-dependent. For example, (m= 1,n=
1) indicates that the two vehicles, the AV and the obstacle-
of-attention, are driving towards each other, either along
the lane direction or perpendicular to the lane direction. The
reasonable conditions are the obstacle-of-attention takes some
response time t ′ before it applies a brake; the most adverse
condition is to use the minimum slowing down acceleration
a′∗,− = a′min,−. When the two vehicles are driving towards
the same direction, which is represented by (m= 0,n=−1),
the most adverse condition is that the obstacle-of-attention
instantly brakes (t ′ = 0) with highest possible acceleration
a′∗,− = a′max,−.
Parameters t ′,a′∗,+/−,v
′,a∗,+/−,dµ depend on various envi-
ronmental conditions and user’s safety preference. In practice,
under bad weather or road conditions, we may adopt lower
v′ and a′max,+/− than normal conditions, because vehicles
tend to drive slower and apply cautious speed changes. dµ is
the minimum distance between the two vehicles, when they
perform safe actions [52] and full stop. Users may specify
larger dµ to allow a larger safety margin or smaller dµ to
achieve higher driving flexibility. Higher a∗.+/− enables the
AV to react more agile, but may lead to the worse passenger
experience. At any time, the AV speed v is known. The AV
sensors detect the speed of the obstacle-of-attention. Collaps-
ing all the parameters and grouping by the only variable t
gives a quadratic form as Equation 8. Notice that α and β
are non-negative.
dmin = αt2+β t+ γ,
where α =
1
2
amax,++
a2max,+
2amin,−
, β = v+
vamax,+
amin,−
, γ =
v2
2amin,−
(8)
According to RSS [52], if the current distance d is larger
than dmin, the safety criteria is met. Without loss of generosity,
a safety score function can be defined as Equation 9. σ is
the reward specified by users to achieve extra margin from
minimal safety distance; η is the penalty of unit distance less
than the minimum safety distance.
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Figure 16: Illustration of d-θ and t-dmin.
Safety Score =
{
σ(d−dmin), i f d > dmin
η(d−dmin),elsewhere (9)
We employ Equation 8 to bridge the safety score with
computing system response time. First, the current distance d
between the AV and the obstacle-of-attention will determine
the response time window θ that will avoid the collision. The
response time window θ is the time that the AV would take
to hit the obstacle-of-attention, if both vehicles keep moving
at the same velocity and acceleration – or more formally, if
both vehicles conform the Duty of Care, i.e. an individual
should exercise "reasonable care" while performing actions
that might harm the safety of others [52]. For instance, the
Duty of Care allows the front car to perform break, such that
the distance to the rear car is reduced, but prohibits the front
car to backup, when followed by another car. We determine
θ by solving the following function:
d = αθ 2+βθ + γ (10)
Safety Score =
{
σ [α(θ 2− t2)+β (θ − t)], i fθ > t
η [α(θ 2− t2)+β (θ − t)],elsewhere
(11)
Let t be the AV computing system response time and deter-
mine dmin = αt2+β t+ γ . Figure 16 depicts the relationship
between Equation 8 with the current distance d and instan-
taneous computing system response time t. Then the safety
score function can be written as Equation 11.
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